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Abstract
A Venn diagram is used to show the e¢ cient allocation of resources in terms of the core of
Shapley-Shubik games and general equilibrium models. These concepts are applied to study the
role of real nance in growth with and endogenous, cash in advance, money in utility function
and applied dynamic general equilibrium model of Germany, France and UK. Computations
of the general equilibrium model conrms the over nancing hypothesis. The actual nan-
cial deepening was 3.5, 2.4 and 5.1 times more than optimal nancial deepening for France,
Germany and the UK respectively. This explains the wide-spread impacts of nancial crises
on growth and employment in these economies that was observed after the 2008 recessions.
Shocks in nancial deepening ratio cause massive macroeconomic uctuations. Smooth and
sustainable growth of the economy requires adoptions of the separating equilibrium in line of
Miller-Stiglitz-Roth mechanisms to avoid the problem of asymmetric information in process of
nancial intermediation.
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1 Financial Crises
Economic crises of 2008/09 that originated from the burst of housing market bubble and the credit
crises in the US spread around the globe. Recessions hit the US, UK, EU, Japan and many other
advanced countries hard and slowed down growth and other economic activities in these countries.
Output, employment, investment, capital accumulation, exports, imports shrank causing alarming
loss of income, deterioration in living standards of households and loss of business or prot prospects
of small, medium and large scale rms. Governments have attempted to stimulate the aggregate
demand by expanding the public expenditure and cutting down the taxes despite growing risk of
accumulation of public debt. Central banks have reduced the basic interest rate to a record low
rate since the beginning of central banking (on January 2009 Federal fund rate has remained close
to zero, Bank of Englands basic rate is 0.5 percent since 2009 and ECB now has 0.5 rate1) in order
to expand the liquidity is the system. Sources of credit levels of banks have been expanded under
the quantitative easing.
The fact that the process of capital accumulation and growth in modern economies is enhanced
substantially by the nancial markets that channel resources of millions of risk adverse savers
to millions of risk neutral borrowers is well recognised. Schumpeter (1911) argued for nancial
development for economic growth but Robinson (1952) viewed that nancial development a by-
product of economic growth process. Importance of risk minimisation and e¢ ciency of portfolio
allocation was noted by Sproul (1947) Smith (1958) and Chiang (1959). Then Tobin (1969) linked
the balancesheet of the nancial system to economic growth. Klein (1971) had a theory of Banking
rm. The process of nancial deepening was discussed by Shaw (1973) applied in the context of
developing economies by McKinnon (1973), Fry (1978), Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny (1996), Champ,
Smith and Williamson (1996). King and Levine (1993) and Levein (1997) tested these propositions
empirically across countries. Hills and Thomas and Dimsdale (2010) and Davies et al. (2010) had
put issues of recessions and banking evolution in the context of the UK economy.
The second round of literature in nancial deepening and growth took the form of strategic
modelling of bargaining (Nash (1951)) and signalling problem and coalitions formation (Shapley
(1953), Shapley and Shubik (1969)) and mechanism design (Rogerson (1985), Rasmusen (1987),
Milde and Riley (1988), Beaudry and Poitevin (1995), Riley (2001), Cripps (1997), Dasgupta and
Maskin (2000) and Roth (2008)). Analysis of consequences of bank-runs (Diamond,and Dybvig
(1983)), informal nance (Bolnick(1987)), stochastic factors (Boyd and Prescott (1986) was further
rened in the nancial structure and growth of economies in Towsend (1983) and Bhattarai (1997).
Consequences of transaction cost in bilateral and multilateral negotiations (Balasko (2003), Kiy-
otaki and Moore (2006)) and nancial deepening (Townsend and Ueda (2006)) were considered.
Neoclassical and neo-Keynesian modeling paradigm of King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994), Wick-
ens (1995), Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000), Chadha
and Nolan (2002) and Covas and Den Haan (2012) have been useful in linking nancial sectors to
economic growth.
Importance of the liquidity of the banking sector in theoretical or empirical settings were
analysed in Epstein and Zin (1989), Fama (1980), Spencer(1984), Bank of England (1999, 2001),
Friedman (2005), Spencer (2008), Arestis, Demtriades and Luintel (2001), Raghuram and Zingales
(1998), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992), Radelet, Sachs, Cooper and Bosworth (1998), Cecchetti
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(2009), Brunnermeier (2009), Taylor (2010), Giovannini and de Melo (1993) and Gai, Kapadia,
Millard and Perez (2008).
General equilibrium impacts of nance on economic growth got special attention in Greenwood,
and Javanovic (1990), Mercenier and Srinivasan ed. (1994), Altig, Carlstrom and Lansing (1995),
Ginsburgh and Keyzer (1997), Bhattarai (1997). There has been resurgence of interest in the re-
lation between the nancial deepening and economics growth (Greenwood and Scharfstein (2013),
Farmer (2013)) in structural changes (Pilbeam, Olmo and Pouliot (2011), Levine,Pearlman, Peren-
dia and Yang (2013)) and income distribution aspects of premium of nancialition (Arestis, Charles
and Fontana (2013)) after the nancial crises of 2008.
Various studies exist on the evaluation of impacts of nancial sector in the economy (Altig et al
(1995), Bacchetta (1992) Bank of England (1999), Brunnermeier (2009), Cecchetti (2009), Champ
et. al (1996), Giovannini and de Melo (1993), De Fraja (1991) and Mayer et. al. (2009)). The issue
how the asymmetry of information on depositors and savers results in volatilities of unimaginable
proportions in these markets and a¤ect the choices of economic agents and prospects of economies
is analysed using theoretical models and empirical evidences. Financial markets often experience
catastrophic failures whenever the expectations of lenders and borrowers do not match market
realities (Friedman (2005), King (1994), Klein (1971), Krugman (1979), Milde and Riley (1988),
Prescott and Townsend (1984), Rasmusen (1987), Riley (2001), Rogerson (1985), Sargent (1987),
Smith (1958), Spencer (1984), Stiglitz, and Weiss (1981), Sinn (2009, 2010), Miller and Stiglitz
(2010), Farmer (2013)) but these studies have had not su¢ ciently addressed how the nancial
deepening has impacted on growth. Problems with saving and loan associations in 1980 in the
US, bank runs and failures of giant banks in Japan in 1990s or the collapse of credit and housing
markets in the US and several EU economies recently with their consequences across the globe are
good examples, including the credit crunch, bank failures, liquidity crises, stock market crash and
bailouts in UK, EU and US in October, 2008.
Classical economists had put capital accumulation at the centre of economic growth (Figure 1).
For them higher degree of nancial deepening through saving and investment activities promote
the level of income and raises the rates of economic growth. No economist can disagree that the
economic advancement is impossible without a reasonable degree of nancial deepening as measured
in the ratios of capital stock to GDP ratio or less precisely by M3/GDP ratios (for France, Germany
and UK see Figure 2). This paper aims to analyse these issues using theoretical and applied
methods. Section 2 motivates the paper with a short discussion of the underlying concept of an
e¢ cient competitive equlibrium mechanism contained in non-blocking core in Shapley-Shubik game
and Pareto optimal core in a general equilibrium model that could be applied to analyse e¢ cient
allocations both in goods and asset markets. It illustrates the Schumpetarian view that growth
of the nancial sector is linked to the growth of the rest of the economy over time. Then it
investigates possibilities of uctuations using analytical solutions in models with exogenous and
exogenosu growth of money in the economy. These are illustrated with standard cash in advance
(CIA) and money in utility (MIU) models of the form in Williamson (2008) and Walsh (1998)
in sections 3 and 4. Paper proceeds further taking clues from these prototype models to dynamic
multisectoral and multi-household general equilibrium models of Germany, France and UK in section
5 to establish the e¢ cient and optimal path of capital output ratios implied by such equilibrium
process rening concepts illustrated in (Bhattarai 1997 and 2005). The conclusions, references and
appendices supporting the study are in the nal section.
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Table 1: Financial Deepening in Three EU Economies
France Germany United Kingdom
FA GDP FDratio FA GDP FDratio FA GDP FDratio
2007 20.52 1.89 10.88 19.34 2.43 7.96 21.27 1.41 15.06
2008 19.44 1.93 10.06 19.54 2.47 7.90 28.80 1.44 19.66
2009 20.39 1.89 10.81 19.75 2.37 8.32 24.90 1.40 17.76
2010 21.31 1.94 11.00 20.40 2.50 8.17 26.92 1.47 18.36
2011 21.97 2.00 10.98 20.80 2.59 8.02 29.01 1.52 19.14
D a t a S o u r c e : O E C D (n a t io n a l a c c o u n t s s e c t io n ) . FA = N o n c o n s o l id a t e d F in a n c ia l A s s e t s a n d Y = G D P b o th in Tr i l l i o n s ; F D ra t io = FA /G D P
FA a n d G D P a r e in Tr i l l i o n s o f N a t io n a l C u r r e n c i e s ;
1: Financial Deepening and Economic Growth
2: Financial Deepening Index
Stocks of total nancial assets are much larger than stocks of M3 assets. From the OECD data
summarised in Table1, one can observe that the nancial deepening ratios (FDratios) are twice as
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large in the UK than those in Germany. French FDratios seem to a bit higher than in Germany but
much smaller than in the UK. The non-consolidated nancial assets include currency and deposits,
nancial derivatives, securities, shares and equities. Using four indicators of nancial development
for about 119 countries for 1960 to 1989 King and Levin (1993) had showed empirical support for the
Schumpeterian hypothesis that nancial development leads to economic growth in contrast to the
Robinsonian argument that growth rate of output had little connection to the nancial development
and the long run growth is a function of real physical capital not the nancial leverages or derivatives
that promotes the articial nancial deepening. Over-nancing however is a phinomenon that has
become more serios in the last two decades. Our general equilibrium computations shows that there
is little di¤erence between the real nancial deepening across these countries - much else is caused
by casino capitalism (Sinn 2009, 2010) or asset bubbles and collective illusion (Miller and Stiglitz
(2010)). Farmer (2013) shows adverse consequences on growth when asset prices are unbounded
above.
Thus the main aim of this paper is to show how economies are volnerables of good or bad
nancial sector policies, degree of over-nancing and wide ranging ine¢ ciencies, uctuations in
growth of output and other economic activities because of this.
2 Core and E¢ cient Allocations
Game theory and general equilibrium models analyse optimal choices of consumers and producers
faced with resource constraints in which the essential process involves nding the core of bargaining
over the gains from the intra and intertemporal trade on goods, services and nancial assets. The
core in a bargaining game is given by the payo¤ from a non-blocking coalition. It is a Pareto
e¢ cient point. Similarly core of a general equilibrium lies in the contract curve where it is di¢ cult
to make one economic agent better o¤ without making another worse o¤. The core of the coalition
in the game and core in a general equilibrium model represent basically the same e¢ cient point
and relative prices. The optimal allocation of resources to economic agents possible with given
endowments conrm to the rst and second theorems of welfare economics. Solutions of both
models characterise the optimal allocation of resources after more complex bid and o¤er interactions
among economic agents. Debreu and Scarf (1963) had proven the equivalence of a competitive
equilibrium to the core of the game for economies with and without production by contradiction
when preferences are non-satiable, strictly convex and continuous. Scarf (1967) theorem states
that a balanced n person game has a non-empty core. Financial markets open each time, bid-o¤er
process sets the prices of assets, exchange takes place in the core. This process continues forever.
Thus the competitive equilibrium is equivalent to the allocation at the core, An exchange economy
with convex preferences always gives rise to a balanced n person game and such will always have
a nonempty core (Scarf (1967)).This model is best illustrated in terms of a Venn diagram with
three players as given in Figure 3 below.
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It is natural that economic agents play a zero sum and non-cooperative game until they realise
the benets of coalition and cooperation (Gale (1986)). When an agreement is made and cooperation
is achieved there is a question on whether such coalition is stable or not. There are always incentives
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at least for one of the player to cheat others from this cooperative agreement in order to raise its
own share of the gain. However, it is unlikely that any player can fool all others at all the times.
Others will discover such cheating sooner or later. A coalition of players should full individual
rationality, group rationality and coalition rationality. These can be ascertained by the supper-
additivity property of coalition where the maximisation of gain requires being a member of the
coalition rather than playing alone. Superadditivity condition implies that the value of the game
in a coalition is greater than the sum of the value of the game of playing alone by those individual
members. In case of three players this means:
v (1 [ 2 [ 3)  v1 (1) + v (2) + v (3) (2)
Coalitions (parties) playing together generate more value, v (1 [ 2 [ 3) ; for each of its member
than when they play alone with payo¤s v1 (1) ; v (2) ;and v (3). Team spirit generates extra benets.
This is a tiny set of core equilibrium as illustrated by the intersection of 1,2, and 3 in the Venn
diagram.
3 : Ve n n D ia g r am
The dynamic economy implied by this model can better be explained using a diagram as in
Figure 4 where the E-E is allocations at the core; LL market valuations of lenders; BB the market
valuation of borrowers. The gap between LL and BB reects the subjective di¤erence in the
assessment of prospects of nancial assets and reason for trades among lenders and borrowers.
4 : E q u i l ib r iu m a n d C o r e in A s s e t M a rk e t s O v e r T im e
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Table 2: Endogenous growth with nancial e¢ ciency
Parameters   y0 z s
CIA 0:02 0:95 1 (0:15; 0:05) 0:15
Market equilibrium presented above assumes complete information among lenders and borrowers
ignoring the asymmetry of information in nancial markets, which is the underlying case of deviation
of asset accumulation path of borrowers (BB) and lenders (LL) of the equilibrium path (EE) in
Figure 4. The main intuitive points are as follows:
1. Assets are results of consumption saving behavior resulting from the intertemporal optimisa-
tion of households or rms.
2. There is an equilibrium allocation EE for each time period of the economy that is at the core
of the equilibrium.
3. Lenders and borrowers start with di¤erent amounts of endowments and bargain continuously
in order to gain more from the transaction.
4. Underlying productivity and preferences cause di¤erentiation in valuation by the buyers and
sellers in the asset markets. Therefore the valuation can be generalised in n number of cases.
5. Corrective measures are taken by individuals or the policy makers when these valuations
signicantly deviate away from the underlying equilibrium destabilising the whole nancial
system.
6. The asset accumulation prole can contain overlapping generations and has innite life in
contrast to individual traders with nite life.
7. There are gains from trading in the nancial markets. Whether the lenders or the borrowers
get the larger shares of this gain depend on their bargaining power, which changes over time.
Above dynamic economy can be expressed with a simple stochastic technology Yt = ztKt where
zt  N
 
0; 2

, capital accumulation takes the form It = Kt+1   (1  )Kt, and amount of invest-
ment deviates from saving depending on the e¢ ciency of nancial markets (0 <  < 1), It = St
in spirit of Wickens (1995) or Price (1997) or more recently in Levin et al. (2013). Assuming market
clearing Yt = Ct + St and a steady economy Kt+1 = (1 + g)Kt and IY =
S
Y and the parameters
z; ; s and  in Table 2 determine the growth rate of the economy (Bhattarai, 1997, 2005) as shown
in Fig. 5.
g = z
I
Y
   = zs   (3)
* It = St = (1 + g)Kt   (1  )Kt = (g + )K = (g + ) Yz

:
It is important to show that nancial and real sectors of the economy are mirror images of each
other using an asset accumulation equation as
At (1 + brt) +Wt   Ct = At+1 (4)
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where Ct is consumption, At nancial assets, Wt endowment, and brt+1 return to asset net of
tax and depreciation rate; brt = (1  k) (r   ) with r real interest rate,  rate of depreciation and
k capital income tax. When k = 0; (4) can be written as
Atrt +Wt   Ct   fAt+1   (1  )Atg = 0 (5)
Now replacing At by Kt and using denition of income Yt = Atrt +Wt = Ct + It
Yt   Ct   (Kt+1   (1  )Kt) = 0; =)=) Yt = Ct + It (6)
Thus the stocks of nancial assets must balance to the stocks of physical capital in an economy
but their values are sensitive to market conditions. Mechanism of incentive compatible contracts
contained in Maskin, Tirole (1990) and Roth (2008) could be applied to separate normal borrower
and lenders from risky ones under assymetric information to solve moral hazard or adverse selection
problems required to e¢ cient equilibrium path EE by minimising gaps in their evaluation as shown
above by LL and BB lines in Figure 4. Kiyotaki and Moore (2006) illustrate importance of the
bilateral and multilateral commitment in maintaining the e¢ ciency of the nancial system ().
How nancial crises of 2008 could be explained due to the shocks to these real sides of the nancial
system is illustrated with standard dynamics contained in simple cash in advance (CIA) and money
in utility (MIU) models of the form discussed in Williamson (2008) and Walsh (1998), in the next
two sections before presenting more elaborate general equilibrium models of France, Germany and
the UK.
3 Friedmand Rule with Cash in Advance Constraint
How the nancial sector can contribute most to the economic growth when stock of money grows
according to the growth rate output can be shown by solutions based on the optimal conditions
in a cash in advance monetary economy where households maximise lifetime utility U(Ct) from
consumption (Ct) but experience disutility from labour from e¤orts put in work, V (Lt). The
problem of the economy is to maximize this utility (7) with technology (8), cash in advance (9) and
lifetime budget constraints (10)as:
max
1X
t=0
t [U(Ct)  V (Lt)] (7)
Subject to the technology constraint:
Yt = zLt (8)
and the Cash in advance constraint
PtCt + qtBt+1 + PtstXt+1 + PtTt =Mt +Bt + PtXt (9)
where PtCt is consumption expenditure, Pt price of goods, Ct consumption, Bt+1is the amount of
nominal bonds, qt is the price of nominal bonds, Xt+1real bonds, st prices of real bonds, Tt lump
sum tax payment, Mt money. Budget constraint of the consumer include income from production
and allocation of money for the next period.
8
PtCt + qtBt+1 + PtstXt+1 + PtTt +Mt+1 =Mt +Bt + PtXt + PtzLt (10)
Government controls the money supply and engages itself in inationary tax. Its budget constraint
for a particular time t is:
M t+1  M t =  PtTt (11)
The stock of money grows at a constant rate , thus M t+1 = (1 + )M t. With this provision,
M t =  PtTt: Normalising the cash in advance and budget constraints by 1Mt and denoting the
real values in small case letters, the cash in advance constraint and budget constraints become
ptCt + qtbt+1 (1 + ) + ptstXt+1 + ptTt = mt + bt + ptXt (12)
and
ptCt + qtbt+1 (1 + ) + ptstXt+1 + ptTt +mt+1 (1 + ) = mt + bt + ptXt + ptzLt (13)
The representative agent in the economy chooses Ct, Lt, bt+1, Xt+1, mt+1 from t = 0; 1; 2; :::: to
1: The Bellman value function for this problem is:
v (mt; bt; Xt; pt; qt; st) max
Ct;Lt;bt+1;Xt+1;mt+1
[U(ct)  V (Lt)] + v (mt+1; bt+1; Xt+1; pt+1; qt+1; st+1)
(14)
With the rst order conditions for dynamic optimisation, as given in the appendix A; the steady
state levels of prices and quantities are obtained in terms of parameters ;  and z . First simplify
the steady state with mt = 1; bt = 0; Xt = 0: Then above equilibrium conditions, the budget
constraint becomes:
ptCt = 1 +  (15)
This shows that in CIA model like this money is held only for consumption which equals total
output, Ct = zLt. Setting steady state variables to constant values, Ct = C, Lt = L, pt = p,
qt = q, st = s analytical solutions for prices and quantities are then expressed in terms of subjective
discount factor () and the growth rate of money supply ().
Price of nominal bond from (A.10) is given in terms of  and :
q =

1 + 
(16)
Price of real bond from (A.11) is:
s =  (17)
The level of employment is given implicitly by (A.12)
(1 + )V 0(Lt)  zU 0(zL) = 0 (18)
Given the steady state (C) the price of commodity is directly proportional to the growth rate of
money supply and inversely to the level of output and the productivity of the labour:
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Table 3: Parameters of CIA Model
Parameters   L0 z m b X
CIA 0:03 0:99 100 (1; 0:05) 1 0 0
p =
1 + 
C
=
1 + 
zL
(19)
Nominal interest rate depends on the price of nominal bonds, directly on the growth rate of money
and inversely on the discount factor.
R =
1
q
  1 = 1 + 

  1 (20)
Real interest rate inversely relates to the price of real bond and the subjective rate of time preference:
r =
1
s
  1 = 1

  1 (21)
Ination rate equals the growth rate of money supply in the steady state:
i =
Pt+1
Pt
  1 =
pt+1Mt+1
ptM t
  1 = 1 +   1 =  (22)
Fisher equation implies gross real interest rate to be inverse of the discount factor:
1 + r =
1 +R
1 + i
=
1 + 

 1 +  = 1

(23)
Thus the prices q; s; p; R; r; i and  are all solved in terms of growth rate of money () and
the discount rate (). From the equilibrium condition Y = C = zL = 1+P and L =
1+
zP . Thus the
level of output, consumption and employment increase with  and decline with ination. While the
greater liquidity helps to mobilise resources, the higher rate of ination distorts the intertemporal
decisions. Higher growth rate of money supply lowers the level of employment by causing distortions
through ination.
Now let us perturb this model around this steady state and show how the shocks in growth rate
of money supply or the level of technology can impact on the transitional dynamics of the economy.
These are shown in a series charts that represent solutions of this model to the shocks in  or z
for given values of parameters in Table 3.
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Technological shocks in CIA Model
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Consumption in Cash in Advance Model
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Table 4: Parameters of CA Model
Parameters    gy L0 v gm ln (z) M0
Country 1 0:05 0:5 0:95 0:01 100 1 0:01 (1; 0:05) 100
Country 2 0.05 0.4 0.99 0.02 100 2 0.02 (1; 0:05) 100
Country 3 0.05 0.45 0.98 0.015 100 3 0.015 (1; 0:05) 100
ush
Utility of household in CIA Model
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This means under the Friedman rule the cash in advance constraint does not bind. There are
no distortions between the real and nomilal assets; the rate of return in all assets are equal in
equilibrium.
With parameter sets in Table 4, a simple three country version of this model is solved subject
to idiosyncratic technological shocks for 15 years to generate time proles of capital, output, prices,
money, consumption, investment , labour supply and lifetime utilities of households as shown by
multiple bars for three interdependent economies, i = 1; 2; 3. The uctuations in these economies
are originate in nancial sector and can have signicant consequences in the level of welfare in the
economy.
welfare
Distribution of Welfare by Countries
i1
i2
i3
Fig. 10
Main lessons that can be drawn from above model is that the nancial crises occur because of
shift in the investor and consumer condences, changes in perceptions and beliefs and technological
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shocks that hit the system. Impacts of such changes can be very sudden which a¤ects the velocity
of circulation of money, technological progress, discount factors or the beliefs in the underlying
growth rates of the economy. These factors impact on prices, trend of output, prices and other
features of the economy as shown by the path of model variables and welfare solutions as presented
in above gures. It is clear that a balanced path of nancial depth enhances welfare of households
but this depends on the attitude of the consumers toward the future of the economy. By raising
discount rate for future economic activities, nancial crises, this will have adverse consequences in
capital formation, output, consumption and welfare of households (see Chada and Nolan (2002) for
new Keynesian perspective on such models). These features are not typical of an economy with
exogenous money but can persist even with the endogenous growth rate of money. This is shown
using a solution of the money in utility function model in the next section.
4 Financing with Money in the Utility Function
Role of money was for pure exchange in the cash in advance model and the growth rate of money 
was exogenous. There are circumstances when household prefer to store cash, particularly during
the nancial crises, stock of money is endogenous to household decision. This feature is captured
by the money in the utility function model. When this desire is excessive it causes a crisis in the
system as observed during the recession that started in 2008. The problem of household as in the
CIA is to maximise the lifetime welfare that is obtained by consumption and money.
maxW =
1X
t=0

tU(ct;mt)

(24)
Subject to the technology constraint:
Yt = zF (Kt; Lt) (25)
Under constant returns to scale yt = f (kt) where yt = YtLt and kt =
Kt
Lt
. Economy wide budget
constraint is given by
Yt +  tLt + (1  )Kt 1 + Mt 1
Pt 1
= Ct +Kt +
Mt
Pt
(26)
where Yt is output, Pt price of goods, Ct consumption, Kt+1is capital stock,  t is net transfer for
each individual, Mt money, Lt employment and  is the rate of depreciation of capital. In per
capita terms
!t = f (kt 1) +  t +

1  
1 + n

kt 1 +
mt 1
(1 + t) (1 + n)
= ct + kt +mt (27)
The dynamic program of this problem is:
V (!t) = u (ct;mt) + V (!t+1) (28)
V (!t) = max

u (ct;mt) + V

f (!t   ct  mt) +  t+1 +

1  
1 + n

(!t   ct  mt) + mt
(1 + t+1) (1 + n)

(29)
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Table 5: Parameters of MIU Model
Parameters    z
MIU 0:3 0:99 0:05 (1; 0:05)
Dynamic optimisation with the rst order conditions presented in Appendix B results into:
um(ct;mt) +
uc(ct+1;mt+1)
(1 + t+1) (1 + n)
= uc(ct;mt) (30)
Left hand side gives the total marginal benet of holding money; the rst term in it is the direct
utility of money and the second term denotes the real balance e¤ect of holding money mt at t for
t+1. Thus the marginal utility of holding money should equal to marginal utility of consumption.
By constant returns to scale assumption rkk + w = fkk + (f(k)  fkk) = f(k). Consider a steady
state with n = 0 and V! (!t) = V! (!t+1) = V! (!ss). From the rst rst order conditions 1  
 [fk (k
ss) + (1  )] = 0
zfk (k
ss) + (1  ) = 1

Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function f(k) = zk this condition converts to zk 1
+(1  ) = 1
kss =

z
1 +  (   1)
 1
1 
(31)
Consumption in the steady state:
css = zf (kss)  kss =

z
1 +  (   1)
 
1 
  

z
1 +  (   1)
 1
1 
(32)
Steady state ination rate equals growth rate of money supply:
mss
mss
=
ss   ss
(1 + ss)
= 0
where mss = 0 implies growth rate of money supply, ss = M
ss
Mss , and ination are equal 
ss = ss
. As in the CIA model the transitional dynamics of the MIU model is found numerically for the set
of parameters in Table 5. The response of the economy to shocks are represented in Figures 11 to
15.
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Real Interest in MIU Model
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Random Technology Shocks in the MIU model
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Table 6: Parameters of MIU Model
Parameters    gy L0 v gm ln (z) M0
Economy 1 0:05 0:5 0:95 0:01 100 1 0:01 (1; 0:05) 100
Economy 2 0.05 0.45 0.99 0.02 100 2 0.02 (1; 0:05) 100
Economy 3 0.05 0.45 0.98 0:015 100 1.5 0:015 (1; 0:05) 100
uu
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Consumption in MIU Model
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As suggested by Farmer (2013) and Miller and Stiglitz (2010) above underlying factors for
such uctuations are the moral hazard and adverse selection between lenders and borrowers or the
public or the private sectors or the shocks to the technology or sudden shift in the belief. Analysis of
results of all economic activities is the welfare of the households from the consumption of goods and
services reveals how nancial crises impacts their prospects (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)). Producers
face lower stock of capital and to combine labour and can supply less of those goods and have to
pay more for factors. Direct and indirect taxes distort choices of households (Townsend and Euda
(2006)). Again scenarios are derived from three economies with a set of plausible parameters as
given in Table 6. The time path of variables yt; kt; ct;mt, ut are easily computed based on model
solutions, (Fig 16 and 17).
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Welfare Distribution Across Countries in MIU Model
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The CIA and MIU models provide intuition about the nature of uctuations that a¤ect inter-
dependent economies and allocation of welfare . Policy analyses should be based in more detailed
assessment of the structural features of the economy as found in the microconsistent dataset for
consumption, production and trade. Therefore an attempt is made below in describing an a dy-
namic general equilibrium model of nancial deepening with realistic micro-foundation for analysis
of e¢ ciency, growth and redistribution rening Bhattarai (1997 and 2005) and is illustrated in the
next section.
5 Finance in a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model
A dynamic general equilibrium model properly accounts for the intertemporal preferences of house-
holds between the current and future consumption (and saving), long run decision of investors in
accumulating capital and the policies of government that often distorths positively or negatively
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and a¤ect on choices of rms and households. With the increasing level of globalisation, capital
now ows more swity from one country to another causing volatility in the values of nancial
assets, causing bubbles as shown by Miller and Stiglitz (2010) and it does not settle down until
the investors nd the best return from their investment. It frequently results in runs, panics or
exuberance as shown in Figures 1, 2 and 4 above. Theoretical works to analyse this issue as found
in Greenwood and Boyan (1990), Fama (1980), Levine (1997), Boyd and Prescott (1986), Epstein
and Zin (1989),Townsend (1983)), econometric studies in Arestis, Demtriades and Luintel (2001),
Hansen, Sargent and Tallarini (1999), Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (2000) Raghuram and Zin-
gales (1998), Benarji and Basu (2009), Pilbeam et al. (2011) but very few on applied work in the
framework of a dynamic general equilibrium context (Mercenier and Srinivasan (1994)). Therefore
it is pertinent to present the generic structure of a dynamic general equilibrium model here and to
apply it to France, Germany and the UK to study the long run impacts of nancial deepening in
these economies.
5.1 Consumers
Consumers are forward looking in the model. They are interested in smoothing out their life time
consumption in order to guarantee a certain level of utility or standard of life for each period in
their life. This requires intertemporal optimisation over the life time, maximising lifetime utility 
Uh0

given the life-time income (35) and budget constraints (36). Each consumer starting from
initial endowment of physical capital
 
Kh0

and labour time
 
Lh0

makes decision to consume (Ci)
and work

LSht = L
h
t   Lht

and save from its full income
 
Iht

in each period leaving it to the
banking system to channel those savings to the potential investors.
Uh0 =
1X
t=1
Uht (33)
Uht = U
 
Chi;t; L
h
t ;c

(34)
Ih0 =
" 1X
t=0
e t
NX
i=1

Pi;t (1 + ti)C
h
i;t
	
+ wht (1  tl)Lht
#
(35)
=
1X
t=0
e tIht =
" 1X
t=0
wht (1  tl)L
h
t + rt (1  tk)Kht
#
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
Pi;t
 
1 + thci

Chi;t =
TX
t=0

rt (1  tk)Kht +Rht + wht (1  tl)LSht

(36)
Households supply factors of production, Kht and LS
h
t , to rms. They receive net of tax wage
income in return to labour supply [ wht (1  tl)L
h
t ] and capital income [rt (1  tk)Kht ] in return to
their investment. They pay taxes on their capital and labour incomes and may receive transfer
payments from the government on the mean tested basis.
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5.2 Firms
Firms are central to the supply of goods and services. Given the production technology optimal
choices of inputs are made to maximise prot in each period and over the model horizon. Entry and
exit is allowed with regulations to maintain a competitive economy. Therefore in each period, rms
compare prices of inputs
 
ri;t; w
h
t ; pi;t

and products and determine the optimum level of output
that would maximise inputs. Implicitly the level of output depends on relative prices of inputs and
outputs as:
Yi;t = Fi

Ki;t
 
ri;t; w
h
t ; pi;t

p; Li
 
wht ; pi;t

; Ai; c

(37)
TX
t=0
Pi;tYi;t =
TX
t=0
"
rt (1 + tk)Ki;t +
HX
h=i
wht (1 + tl)L
h
i;t
#
(38)
The structure of inputs and levels of technology may di¤er for rms operating in di¤erent sectors
- agriculture, manufacturing, services, but all of them are interested to maximise total prot given
the process of capital accumulation, Ki;t = (1  i;t)Ki;t 1 + Ii;t.
5.3 Trade
Economies modelled here are price takers in the global market except that they need to balance
their trade over time. Adjustment in the real exchange rates brings such balance in the value of
imports [
TP
t=0
NP
i=1
PMi;tMi;t] and exports [
TP
t=0
NP
i=1
PEi;tEi;t] and net ows of capital [ FLt].
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
PEi;tEi;t =
TX
t=0
NX
i=1
PMi;tMi;t (39)
NX
i=1
PEi;tEi;t  
NX
i=1
PMi;tMi;t =  FLt (40)
5.4 Government
Government provides public services like law and order, education and health, social security and
pension and protection of environment to households and rms and adds to the public capital by
investing economic infrastructure, health and education. These expenditures enahanc productivity
and make these economies more competitive in the global market. In a dynamic econnomy the
public spending should balance to the public revenue as shown in (41).
1X
t=0
e tRVt 7
1X
t=0
e t
 
Gt +R
h
t

(41)
Government collects revenue through direct taxes on income of households and rms and indirect
taxes on their consumption. The optimal level of public expenditure and revenues is set when the
benets from the public spending equal the costs of public funds in equilibrium (see Mirrlees et at.
(2010)).
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5.5 Financial Deepening
Financial deepening (Ft) is the result of the groth process in the economy and varies across pro-
duction sectors ( Fi;t) through investment and saving activities. Banks channel funds saved by
households or enterprises for investment by rms at the real interest rate that matches cost and
productivity of funds to the rms. The degree of real nancial deepening is then is indicated by
the ratio of capital stocks to the GDP.
Ft =
Kt
Yt
; Fi;t =
Ki;t
Yi;t
(42)
This real measure of optimal nancial deepening, resulting from the optimisation behaviour of
consumers and rms in the economy, should equal to the ratio of nancial assets to GDP in the
nancial market in an ideal world. Such intertemporal equilibria is guaranteed by the exibility
of prices, wages and interest rates in the economy. Imbalances either due to the rigid or inexible
prices cause market imperfections or crises.
Good nancial policies result in right set of accumulation process and higher growth rate of
the economy over periods. Wrong nancial sector policies lead to mismatch between the volume
borrowed and lent, that often manifests in terms of bail outs or subsidies or preferential treatment
of one sector against another, which distorts the accumulation process ultimately reducing the
prospects of the economy in the long run.
5.6 Markets
This dynamic economy is run e¢ ciently by the market clearing relative price system. Prices of
commodities and services and factors of production continue to adjust until demands are balanced
to supplies in each market. The applied general equilibrium model that was used to assess prospects
of nancial development in three economies consisted of eleven sectors of goods and services, capital
assets di¤erentiated by sectors and labour di¤erentiated by skills. The real exchange rate links
between the domestic and foreign sectors were results of the ow of imports and exports.
6 Analysis of Dynamic GE Model of Financial Deepening
The micro-consistent data for this model is taken from the input output table published by the
OECD in 2006 for Germany, France and UK (Appendix Tables C1 - C3 available upon request).
This data set provide information on the actual values for demand supply balances of rms, revenue
and expenditure of the government, saving and investment balance for the private sector and the
export-import balance for the economy.
A number of assumptions are made regarding the nature of the steady states among these
economies. First, bench mark rate of return on capital stock is chosen to be the natural rate of
interest (r) for each country. Information about the rate of deprecation of capital (i) in each sector
is obtained from the historical data and tested with sensitivity analyses. The steady state growth
rates (gi) are made consistent with the historical growth rates for each sector. The parametric values
of r; i and gi dene the reference path of the economy. Elasticities of substitution in consumption
(c) and production (p) are based on the literature. Fundamentals to all these is the optimising
behavior of households regarding the division of labour between leisure
 
Lht

and work and division
of income between consumption
 
Cht

and saving
 
Sht

. Tax rates

tc; tw; tk; R
h
t
	
are retained for
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Table 7: Optimal and actual nancial deepening in Frnace, Germany and the UKl
Parameters Optimal Financial Deepening Actual Financial Deepening Over Financing
France 3.16 10.98 3.5
Germany 3.31 8.02 2.4
UK 3.24 19.12 5.1
all sectors except for the nancial and real estate sectors in the counter factual analyses. Model is
applied for policy analysis only after the calibration of the benchmark economies.
6.1 Optimal and actual nancial deepening
The general equilibrium theory provides a very solid framework for analysis of results obtained by
solving more than 14 thousands equations simultaneously for France, Germany and UK. Results
on optimal and actual nancial deepening, the ratios of nancial assets of GDP, relevant for this
paper are summarised in Table 7 below2 .
The overall optimal real nancial deepening ratios from the general equilibrium models are
consistent across countries; these are found to be around 3.31 in Germany, 3.16 in France and 3.24
for the UK. These are sensible results and consistent to the converging patterns of economic growth
across these countries. The actual ratios of nancial deepening were 10.98, 8.02 and 19.12 given
in Table were 3.5, 2.4 and 5.1 time higher than the optimal ratios computed from the solutions of
the general equilibrium models for three economies as shown in Table 7. The discrepancy between
the real and the nominal magnitudes of nancial deepening gives credibility to the hypothesis
that UK economy is more vulnerable to nancial crises as it has more assets originating from the
nancial derivatives and more subject to the problems caused by asymmetric information. Sectoral
impacts of nancial sector reforms are di¤erent for each of three countries. Despite this economic
growth rates in these models are driven by fundamentals of the nancial markets based on the
net present value calculation, portfolio selection satisfying the arbitrage across market, risk-return
analysis to minimise risks and maximise returns and insurances to cover unforeseen contingencies.
Supply of funds arises from inter-temporal utility maximising consumers and demand for funds for
investment originates from prot maximising producers. Subjective discount factors of consumers
and depreciation rates of capital is balanced by the real interest rates so that funds are allocated
according to the marginal utilities of households or productivities across various sectors leaving
regulatory roles to the government for maintaining law and order to creates opportunities for the
participants from the private sector.
On-going nancial sector reforms can be expected to make these economies more e¢ cient so
that the costs of funds decline in the counter factual experiments, where the taxes on the nancial
sectors are set to minimise distortions relative to the benchmark. Such measures will then result in
the higher rate of growth of output, employment and capital stock in almost all sectors even with
lower capita output ratios. The nancial liberalisation is paying for itself, welfare of consumers
improves with reforms rather than without it.
2Detailed solutions of these models to be available upon request.
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The proper reforms of nancial markets improve e¢ ciency of nancial intermediation and brings
speedier rate of economic growth by linking the lending and borrowing rates to the fundamentals of
demand and supply of funds; removing controls on credits; by creating right structure of incentives
for investors and depositors and freeing up the foreign exchange market from arbitrary decisions
and by making it subject to fundamentals of domestic and foreign markets. These mechanism
remove repressionary regimes with non inationary public nance for smooth process of capital ac-
cumulation, increased liquidity, technical advancement and economic growth, elimination of parallel
markets and reducing the proportion of toxic non-performing assets. Liberation and reform mecha-
nisms thus are instrumental in reversing repressionary nancial regimes towards more classical free
enterprise economy that would promote accumulation and growth in these model economies.
The general equilibrium model results presented above rely on classical economic principles in
which the self-adjusting mechanism of the real interest rates would balance demand for and supply
of nancial assets in a market driven economy and do not contain liquidity trap and credit crunch
situations as imagined by Keynes (1936). These results are consistent to literature that has emerged
since the late 1960s on harmful impacts of nancial repressions in works of McKinnon (1968), Shaw
(1968), Roubini and Sala-i-Martin (1992) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) and more recently in Boyd
and Jalal (2012).
Competitive nancial markets are perfect in allocating assets as all agents that have complete
information and are e¢ cient in processing such information. This assumption, however, is far from
perfect. Financial markets are full of asymmetric information, activities of one set of players depend
on actions taken by another set of players and the amount of information they have impacts on
the likely choices of others. This requires state contingent incentive compatible mechanisms in this
general equilibrium system and is an issue for further investigation.
7 Conclusion
A Venn diagram is used to show the e¢ cient allocation of resources in terms of the core of Shapley-
Shubik games and general equilibrium models. These concepts are applied to study the role of real
nance in growth with and endogenous, cash in advance, money in utility function and applied
dynamic general equilibrium model of Germany, France and UK. Computations of the general
equilibrium model conrms the over nancing hypothesis. The actual nancial deepening was
3.5, 2.4 and 5.1 times more than optimal nancial deepening for France, Germany and the UK
respectively. This explains the wide-spread impacts of nancial crises on growth and employment
in these economies that was observed after the 2008 recessions. Shocks in nancial deepening
ratio cause massive macroeconomic uctuations. Smooth and sustainable growth of the economy
requires adoptions of the separating equilibrium in line of Miller-Stiglitz-Roth mechanisms to avoid
the problem of asymmetric information in process of nancial intermediation.
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A Cash in Advance Model
It is easier to solve this problem if it is written in a Lagrangian constrained optimisation problem
as:
L (Ct; Lt; bt+1; Xt+1;mt+1; t; t) =
1X
t=0
t [U(Ct)  V (Lt)] (A.1)
+t [mt + bt + ptXt   ptCt   qtbt+1 (1 + )  ptstXt+1   ptTt]
+t [mt + bt + ptXt + ptzLt   ptCt   qtbt+1 (1 + )  ptstXt+1   ptTt  mt+1 (1 + )]
This CIA model is solved analytically with the rst order conditions for optimisations as:
Ct : U
0(Ct)  (t + t) pt = 0 (A.2)
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Lt :  V 0(Lt) + tptz = 0 (A.3)
bt+1 :  qt (1 + ) (t + t) + 
@v
@bt+1
= 0 (A.4)
Xt+1 :  ptst (t + t) + 
@v
@Xt+1
= 0 (A.5)
mt+1 :   (1 + )t + 
@v
@mt+1
= 0 (A.6)
By the envelop theorem on di¤erentiating the Bellman equation:
@v
@bt
= (t + t) (A.7)
@v
@Xt
= pt (t + t) (A.8)
@v
@mt
= (t + t) (A.9)
Combining above last three and the rst two rst order conditions, the middle three FOCs can be
expressed as:
 qt (1 + )U
0(Ct)
pt
+ 
U 0(Ct+1)
pt+1
= 0 (A.10)
 sU 0(Ct) + U 0(Ct+1) = 0 (A.11)
  (1 + )V 0(Lt)
ptz
+ 
U 0(Ct+1)
pt+1
= 0 (A.12)
Higher productivity lowers the level of employment:
dL
d
=
 V 00
(1 + )V 00   z2U 00 < 0 (A.13)
Here  can be set to achieve the optimal ination in ination targeting regimes to maximize
the level of welfare in the economy, max
fCt;Ltgt 1t+0
1P
t=0
t [U(Ct)  V (Lt)]. The optimal employment
(L) is obtained implicity
zU
0
(zL)  V 0(L) = 0 (A.14)
The optimal growth rate of money supply is given by the Friedman rule is  =    1 where the
nominal interest rate is zero
h
R = 1q   1 = 0 =) q = 1
i
, the real interest rate is r = 1   1, cash
in advance constraint does not bind  =    1 because  = 0.
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 =
U 0 (C)
p
   = C:U
0 (C)
1 + 
  V
0 (L)
pz
=
C:U 0 (C)
1 + 
  
1 + 
U 0 (C)
p
=
C:U 0 (C)
1 + 
  
1 + 
C:U 0 (C)
1 + 
=
C:U 0 (C)
1 + 

1  
1 + 

=
C:U 0 (C)
1 + 
(1  q) (A.15)
B Money in Utility Function Model
Again using the Lagrange multiplier (t) to simplify this constrained optimisation problem:
L (ct;mt; t) =
1X
t=0

tu(ct;mt)

+
1X
t=0
t

f (!t   ct  mt) +  t+1 +

1  
1 + n

(!t   ct  mt) + mt
(1 + t+1) (1 + n)

(B.16)
As before solving MIU model explicitly means expressing the prices and quantities like yt; kt; ct;mt
in terms of the preference and technology parameters as ; ;  and n. In other words the optimal
values of variables are determined by subjective discount factor(), depreciation (), productivity
of capital () and growth rate of population (n). This is done using the rst order conditions:
ct : uc(ct;mt)  

fk (kt) +

1  
1 + n

V! (!t+1) = 0 (B.17)
Here marginal utility of holding capital 
h
fk (kt) +

1 
1+n
i
V! (!t+1) should equal the marginal
utility of consumption uc(ct;mt):
m : um(ct;mt)  

fk (kt) +

1  
1 + n

V! (!t+1) +
V! (!t+1)
(1 + t+1) (1 + n)
= 0 (B.18)
Transversality conditions
lim
t!1
ttkt = 0; lim
t!1
ttmt = 0 (B.19)
By envelop theorem:
t = V! (!t) = uc(ct;mt) (B.20)
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